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Abstract
On the one hand we state Nash equilibrium (NE) as a formal theorem on multilinear forms and give
a pedagogically simple proof, free of game theory terminology. On the other hand, inspired by this
formalism, we prove a multilinear minimax theorem, a generalization of von Neumann’s bilinear minimax
theorem. Next, we relate the two theorems by proving that the solution of a multilinear minimax problem,
computable via linear programming, serves as an approximation to Nash equilibrium point, where its
multilinear value provides an upper bound on a convex combination of expected payoffs. Furthermore,
each positive probability vector once assigned to the set of players induces a diagonally-scaled multilinear
minimax optimization with a corresponding approximation to NE. In summary, in this note we exhibit
an infinity of multilinear minimax optimization problems each of which provides a polynomial-time
computable approximation to Nash equilibrium point, known to be difficult to compute. The theoretical
and practical qualities of these approximations are the subject of further investigations.
Keywords: Nash Equilibrium, von Neumann Minimax Theorem, Linear Programming, Matrix Scaling.
1 Nash Equilibrium
Nash equilibrium, [6], is a fundamental result in game theory. The complexity of its computing has been
investigated extensively, e.g. in [1], [4], [5]. In this note we first formally state Nash equilibrium as a theorem
on multidimensional matrices and give a proof not relying on game theory terminology (Section 1). On the
one hand, pedagogically this simplifies its proof. On the other hand, it leads into a multidimensional gener-
alization of von Neumann minimax theorem, where analogous to the bilinear case we give a proof via linear
programming duality (Section 2). We then prove polynomial-time computable solution of a multidimensional
minimax not only provides an approximation to Nash equilibrium point, but a nontrivial upper bound on a
convex combination of expected payoffs in Nash equilibrium as well as the average expected payoffs (Section
3). Furthermore, we consider diagonal scaling of the multidimensional matrix to derive alternate bounds. In
summary, solving multilinear minimax optimization problems is a way to compute approximate solutions to
Nash equilibrium point in polynomial-time.
First, we give some notations and definitions. These are used throughout the article.
Notation 1. Given n ∈ N, let N = {1, . . . , n}. Given ni ∈ N, i ∈ N , let Ni = {1, . . . , ni}. Let N̂ =
N1 × · · · × Nn and n̂ = n1 × · · · × nn. An n-dimensional n̂ matrix is a multidimensional array of real
elements, written as A = (a(I)), where the index vector I = (i1, . . . , in) ranges in N̂ . For each i ∈ N , let
xi = (xi1, . . . , x
i
ni
)T ∈ Rni be a vector of real variables. Set x = (x1, . . . , xn). Given I = (i1, . . . , in) ∈ N̂ , we
write x(I) for the product x1i1 × · · · × x
n
in
. Consider the multilinear form corresponding to A = (a(I)):
A[x] ≡ A[x1, . . . , xn] =
∑
I∈N̂
a(I)x(I).
For each i ∈ N , let Sni = {x ∈ R
ni :
∑ni
j=1 xj = 1, x ≥ 0}. Let
∆n̂ = Sn1 × · · · × Snn .
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Given p = (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ ∆n̂, A[p] is the value of A at p. For each x
i ∈ Rni , i ∈ N , define the linear form
A[p|xi] = A[p1, . . . , pi−1, xi, pi+1, . . . , pn].
Theorem 1. (Nash Equilibrium) Let A0 = (a(i, I)) be an (n + 1)-dimensional n× n̂ matrix, where i ∈ N
and I ∈ N̂ . For each i ∈ N , consider the n-dimensional n̂ submatrix of A0, Ai = (a(i, I)). Then, there
exists p∗ = (p
1
∗
, . . . , pn
∗
) ∈ ∆n̂ such that for each i ∈ N ,
max
xi∈Sni
Ai[p∗|x
i] = Ai[p∗]. (1)
Proof. For each i ∈ N , j ∈ Ni, let e
ni
j ∈ R
ni be the vector with 1 in its j-th coordinate and zero otherwise.
From linearity, for each i ∈ N we have
Ai[p∗|x
i] =
ni∑
j=1
xijAi[p∗|e
ni
j ].
Thus, to prove (1) it is enough to prove there exists p∗ ∈ ∆n̂ such that
Ai[p∗|e
ni
j ] ≤ Ai[p∗], ∀i ∈ N, ∀j ∈ Ni. (2)
Employing (2), an iterative scheme will be defined that given p = (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ ∆n̂ that does not satisfy
(2), attempts to find an improved point via the mapping f(p) = (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ ∆n̂, defined as follows: For
each i ∈ N and j ∈ Ni, let
Gij(p) = max
{
0, Ai[p|e
ni
j ]−Ai[p]
}
, (3)
gij(p) = p
i
j +G
i
j(p), (4)
pij =
gij(p)∑
k∈Ni
gik(p)
. (5)
From (3)-(5) it follows that f(p) ∈ ∆n̂. Since f is continuous, by Brouwer fixed point theorem, there
exists p = (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ ∆n̂ satisfying f(p) = p. We show p satisfies
Gij(p) = 0, ∀i ∈ N, ∀j ∈ Ni. (6)
Clearly (6) implies (2). From (4) and (5), and that f(p) = p, we have
pij =
pij +G
i
j(p)∑
k∈Ni
(pik +G
i
k(p))
=
pij +G
i
j(p)
1 +
∑
k∈Ni
Gik(p)
, (7)
where the second equality uses that
∑
k∈Ni
pik = 1. Let ci =
∑
k∈Ni
Gik(p). From (7) it follows that
cip
i
j = G
i
j(p), ∀j ∈ Ni. (8)
Suppose p does not satisfy (1). Then there exists i ∈ N such that ci > 0. From (3) and (8) we have
cip
i
j = Ai[p|e
ni
j ]−Ai[p], ∀j ∈ Ni. (9)
Multiplying both sides of (9) by pij , summing over j ∈ Ni and using linearity of Ai[p|e
ni
j ], we get
ci
∑
j∈Ni
(pij)
2 =
ni∑
j=1
pijAi[p|e
ni
j ]−
ni∑
j=1
pijAi[p] = Ai[p]−Ai[p] = 0. (10)
But the left-hand-side of (10) is positive, a contradiction. Hence the proof of (6).
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1.1 Game Theory Terminology
Using the same notation as above, N is the set of players. For each player i ∈ N , Ni is his set of pure
actions or pure strategies. Each I = (i1, . . . , in) ∈ N̂ is a pure strategy profile. For each I ∈ N̂ , the matrix
entry a(i, I) is payoff or utility for player i when pure strategy profile I is selected. Each player i may choose
an action according to a mixed strategy with probability vector pi ∈ Sni . When a profile is selected with
probability vector p = (p1, . . . , p1n) ∈ ∆n̂, the expected utility of player i is Ai[p]. Nash equilibrium states that
there exists an equilibrium point p∗ = (p
1
∗
, . . . , pn
∗
) ∈ ∆n̂ such that if player k knows that each players i 6= k
will use probability vectors pi
∗
, he cannot improve his expected utility by selecting any other probability
vector in Snk than p
k
∗
. There is thus equilibrium.
The question of complexity of computing or approximating the equilibrium point p∗ ∈ ∆n̂ has been
studied extensively, [1], [4], [5]. Even its approximation is hard. One may ask: Can we compute upper
bounds on Ai[p∗]? There are of course trivial upper bounds such as the maximum entry of the the matrix
A0, however we may ask: Can we compute nontrivial upper bounds on Ai[p∗]? Motivated by this question,
in the next section we prove a multilinear form of von Neumann’s minimax theorem which is an interesting
problem of independent interest. Then in Section 3 we show how an optimal solution of the minimax
problem gives a bound on a convex combination of Ai[p∗]’s, their average, as well as an approximation to
p∗. In Section 4, we consider some ideas from diagonal scaling to derive alternate bounds on a convex
combination of Ai[p∗], as well as different approximations to p∗.
2 A Mulitinear von Neumann Minimax Theroem
In this section we state and prove a multilinear minimax theorem. As before, let A0 = (a(i, I)), i ∈ N ,
I = (i1, . . . , in) ∈ N̂ be the (n+ 1)-dimensional matrix. Given x ∈ Sn and p ∈ ∆n̂, consider the multilinear
from
A0[x, p] =
∑
i∈N
∑
I∈N̂
xia(i, I)p(I), (11)
where p(I) = p1i1 × · · · × p
n
in
. Clearly,
A0[x, p] = x1A1[p] + · · ·+ xnAn[p]. (12)
Theorem 2. (Multilinear von Neumann Minimax Theorem)
min
x∈Sn
max
p∈∆n̂
A0[x, p] = max
p∈∆n̂
min
x∈Sn
A0[x, p]. (13)
Proof. The proof of (bilinear) von Neumann minimax can be established via linear programming duality
theory, see e.g. [2], [3]. Analogously, we will represent the left-hand-side and right-hand-side of (13) as a
pair of primal and dual linear programs. However, the proof is somewhat trickier than the bilinear case.
For each x ∈ Sn, the maximum of A0[x, p] over p ∈ ∆n̂ is the maximum of
∑
i∈N a(i, I)xi, as I ranges in
N̂ . Thus the value of the left-hand-side in (13) is equivalent to the optimal value of the following primal LP:
min δ
(LP )
∑
i∈N
a(i, I)xi ≤ δ, ∀I ∈ N̂ ,
∑
i∈N
xi = 1,
xi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N.
Next, we consider the value of the right-hand-side in (13). For each p ∈ ∆n̂, the minimum of A0[x, p]
over x ∈ Sn is the minimum of
∑
I∈N̂
a(i, I)p(I) as i ranges in N . We can find the maximum of these over
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p ∈ ∆n̂ by putting a lower bound of λ on each such term and then maximize it over all I in N̂ . For each
I ∈ N̂ we introduce a variable q(I) corresponding to the term p(I). Now consider the following dual LP.
maxλ
(DLP )
∑
I∈N̂
a(i, I)q(I) ≥ λ, ∀i ∈ N,
∑
I∈N̂
q(I) = 1,
q(I) ≥ 0, ∀I ∈ N̂.
We prove (DLP) is the dual of (LP). Let A be the n̂×n constraint matrix corresponding to the inequalities
in (LP) (excluding x ≥ 0). Let en ∈ R
n, and en̂ ∈ R
n̂ be the vector of ones. Then (LP) is equivalent to
min{δ : Ax ≤ δen̂, e
T
nx = 1, x ≥ 0}. (14)
Introducing slacks, s, and writing δ as the difference of two nonnegative variables, (14) is equivalent to:
min{δ1 − δ2 : Ax− δ1en̂ + δ2en̂ + s = 0, e
T
nx = 1, x ≥ 0}. (15)
Since (15) is an stand form LP, its dual can easily be seen to be
max{λ : ATw + λen ≤ 0, − e
T
n̂w ≤ 1, e
T
n̂w ≤ −1, w ≤ 0}. (16)
Replacing w with −w, (16) reduces to
max{λ : ATw ≥ λen, e
T
n̂w = 1, w ≥ 0}. (17)
By identifying w in (17) with the vector of variables corresponding to q(I), I ∈ N̂ , it follows that (17) is
equivalent to (DLP). Hence (LP) and (DLP) are primal-dual pair.
Let us consider the set of q(I), I ∈ N̂ , satisfying the constraints
∑
I∈N̂
q(I) = 1 as an ordered vector,
Q(N̂) in Sn̂, the unit simplex in dimension n̂. Next, for each Q(N̂) ∈ Sn̂ we construct a unique p ∈ ∆n̂, to
be referred as its derived point: For each i ∈ N and each j ∈ Ni, let N̂
i
j be the set of all I ∈ N̂ whose i-th
coordinate is j. Then set
pij =
∑
I∈N̂i
j
q(I). (18)
It is easy to check that the vector pi = (pi1, . . . , p
i
ni
)T lies in Sni . Thus setting p = (p
1, . . . , pn), it follows
that p ∈ ∆n̂. Hence the proof of theorem.
Corollary 1. Let x∗ be an optimal solution of (LP). Let Q∗(N̂) = {q∗(I) : I ∈ N̂} ∈ Sn̂ be an optimal
solution of (DLP) and let p∗ ∈ ∆n̂ be the corresponding derived solution (see (18)). Then
min
x∈Sn
max
p∈∆n̂
A0[x, p] = max
p∈∆n̂
min
x∈Sn
A0[x, p] = A0[x
∗, p∗]. (19)
Furthermore, for each x ∈ Sn and each p ∈ ∆n̂ we have
A0[x
∗, p] ≤ A0[x
∗, p∗] ≤ A0[x, p
∗]. (20)
Proof. By the fact that (LP) and (DLP) are primal and dual pair, it follows that if δ∗ and λ∗ are the
respective optimal objective values, then δ∗ = λ∗.
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Given Q(N̂) ∈ Sn̂, let p ∈ ∆n̂ be its derived point. Next substitute x
∗ for x and δ∗ for δ in (LP). Then
for each I ∈ N̂ multiply the corresponding inequality constraint by q(I), then sum over these inequalities
while replacing Q(N̂) by its derived point to get,
A0[x
∗, p] ≤ δ∗
∑
I∈N̂
q(I) = δ∗. (21)
In particular, substituting Q∗(N̂) we get
A0[x
∗, p∗] ≤ δ∗. (22)
Next substitute for q∗(I), for q(I), I ∈ N̂ in the corresponding inequality in (DLP), then for i ∈ N ,
multiply the i-th inequality constraint by xi, replace Q
∗(N̂) by its derived point p∗ and finally sum these up
to get
A0[x, p
∗] ≥ λ∗
∑
i∈N
xi = λ
∗. (23)
In particular, substituting x∗ we get
A0[x
∗, p∗] ≥ λ∗. (24)
Now from (22) and (24) and that δ∗ = λ∗ we get (19). Next from (21), (23) and (19) we get (20).
3 Bounds On Expected Payoffs in Nash Equilibrium
We now state a connection between Nash equilibrium and an optimal von Neumann minimax pair.
Theorem 3. Let p∗ be an optimal Nash equilibrium point and (x
∗, p∗) an optimal pair of multilinear von
Neumann minimax. We have
A0[x
∗, p∗] ≤ A0[x
∗, p∗] = min
i∈N
Ai[p
∗]. (25)
Let
σn =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Ai[p∗].
Let x∗min = min{x
∗
i : i = 1, . . . , n}. If x
∗
min > 0, and Ai[p∗] ≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n, then
σn ≤
1
nx∗min
A0[x
∗, p∗]. (26)
Proof. The inequality in (25) follows from (20) in Corollary 1, selecting p = p∗. To show the equality in
(25), from (20) and selecting x = eni , the n-vector with one in its i-th position and zero otherwise, it follows
that A0[x
∗, p∗] ≤ min{Ai[p
∗] : i = 1, . . . , n}. On the other hand,
A0[x
∗, p∗] =
n∑
i=1
x∗iAi[p
∗] ≥
n∑
i=1
min{Ai[p
∗] : i = 1, . . . , n}.
To prove (26), we have
A0[x
∗, p∗] =
n∑
i=1
x∗iAi[p∗] ≥ nx
∗
minσn.
Hence the proof.
Theorem 3 implies that by computing the von Neumann minimax pair (x∗, p∗) we can derive an upper
bound on a convex combination of expected payoffs of players at the Nash equilibrium point, as well as
the average expected payoffs. We can thus consider p∗ as an approximation to p∗. The quality of any
approximation to p∗ can be quantified is as follows.
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Definition 1. We say p ∈ ∆n̂ is a t-approximate Nash equilibrium, if t = max{ti : i = 1, . . . , n}, where for
each i = 1, . . . , n, ti is defined as
max
xi∈SNi
Ai[p|x
i] = tiAi[p].
Clearly, the closer t is to one, the better p approximates p∗, or more precisely, Ai[p] approximates Ai[p∗].
The question arises, how good is the quality of p∗? This, we feel, is an important question open to further
investigation.
In the next section we consider alternate bounds by solving alternate minimax problems.
4 Alternate Bounds Via Diagonally Scaled Minimax Relaxations
In what follows we consider alternate minimax problems derived via diagonal scaling of the matrix A0 =
(a(i, I)). Let
S◦n = {x ∈ Sn : x > 0}.
Given each d = (d1, . . . , dn) ∈ S
◦
n, set
A0(d) = (dia(i, I)).
This corresponds to scaling each submatrix Ai of A0 by di. Thus Ai(d) = diAi. We can view d as a vector of
positive probabilities assigned to the set of n players. Next consider the optimal diagonally-scaled minimax
pair of solutions for the matrix A0(d), denote the pair by (x
∗(d), p∗(d)). In particular, (x∗, p∗) in the previous
section corresponds to d = (1/n, . . . , 1/n)T ∈ Rn. As before, denoting p∗ as the Nash equilibrium point for
A0, note that it also remains an equilibrium point for A0(d). However, from Theorem 3 we have
A0(d)[x
∗(d), p∗] ≤ A0(d)[x
∗(d), p∗(d)].
Equivalently, ∑
i∈N
dix
∗
i (d)Ai[p∗] ≤
∑
i∈N
dix
∗
i (d)Ai[p
∗(d)].
Dividing both sides by σ =
∑
i∈N dix
∗
i (d) and letting d
′
i = dix
∗
i (d)/σ, from d ∈ S
◦
n we get a new point
d′ ∈ Sn satisfying an alternate bound ∑
i∈N
d′iAi[p∗] ≤
∑
i∈N
d′iAi[p
∗(d)].
If d′ > 0, we can replace d with d′ and repeat the process. Replacing d with d′ corresponds to a projective
transformation. Some questions arise regarding the above bound for arbitrary d ∈ S◦n. What if we randomly
select such d and compute the above? If d′ = eni , then we will have a bound on Ai[p∗]. In other words we
may be able to produce bounds on individual player payoffs. Another question is what will be the infimum
of the above over d ∈ S◦n? From the practical point of view, for each d ∈ S
◦
n the computation of p
∗(d) gives
rise to a t(d)-approximate solution (see Definition 1). Ideally, the infimum of t(d) equal one.
Final Remarks
Our initial goal was to state a formal but pedagogically simple proof of Nash equilibrium, free of its game
theory interpretations. Numerous proofs are available on the Internet. However, most proofs seem to obscure
the mathematical properties behind the game theory terminology. Nash’s theorem, despite its tremendous
ingenuity and applications, after all is a theorem on multilinear forms. This formal view has offered new
insights on Nash equilibrium. In particular, by proving a multilinear minimax theorem we have arrived at
polynomial-time approximations to Nash equilibrium. These are worthy of further investigation, especially
in view of the inherent difficulty in computing NE, as revealed by tremendous research in game theory.
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As shown here, by solving a primal-dual pair of linear programs, it is possible to obtain upper bounds
on a weighted expected payoff in Nash equilibrium, the average expected payoff, as well as approximate
solutions to equilibrium point. Furthermore, diagonal scaling of the multidimensional matrix gives rise to
new upper bounds and approximate solutions. The fact that the multilinear minimax problem, considered
as a relaxations of Nash equilibrium, is solvable in polynomial-time makes it tractable in theory. It is
also an interesting problem in its own right. For instance, it is interesting to note that since (DLP) has
(n + 1) nontrivial constraints, in an optimal solution at most (n + 1) of the q(I)’s are positive. Note that
even solving the multilinear minimax as a relaxation of Nash equilibrium could be a difficult problem when
there are several players, each having O(n) strategies. This is because in such case the bound based on
the complexity of polynomial-time LP algorithms is a high degree polynomial in n. Nevertheless, having
obtained the minimax pair of solutions (x∗, p∗), we may consider p∗ as a relaxation to p∗ and measure its
quality as a t-approximation solution (see Definition 1). In this note we have also discussed ways to obtain
different approximate solutions through diagonal scaling, resulting in different t-approximate solutions.
Several questions arise, such as: (1) How efficiently can the minimax problems be solved? That is, is
there a way to make use of their structure to give faster algorithms than the straightforward application
of known LP algorithms? (2) Can we bound the quality of p∗ as a t-approximate solution to p∗? (3) Are
there classes of multidimensional matrices for which p∗ gives a good t-approximate solution to p∗? (4) What
is the quality of approximation under diagonal scalings? (5) Finally, can we derive lower bounds to Nash
equilibrium expected payoffs? e.g. instead of solving a minimax problem, by solving a maximin problem
over the corresponding domains.
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